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Based on an extensive sample of U.S. closed-end funds undergoing open-ending, 
we examine the behavior of discounts prior to the announcement till open-ending. 
Discounts are significantly reduced upon announcement of open-ending with price 
increase. Announcement period return is directly related to the pre-announcement 
discount, and other hypothesized characteristics of the fund and investor behavior. 
The role of investor sentiments as an explanator of discounts is weaker after 
announcement. We decompose the pre-announcement discount into structural and 
idiosyncratic parts, and report that there is a greater reduction of the idiosyncratcic 
part of the discount at announcement. Time series behavior of discounts lends 
support to investor confidence. We find that small amounts of discounts remain at the 





















 Termination of closed end funds and behavior of their discounts  
 
1.  Introduction 
We aim to examine the behavior of closed-end fund discounts before, during, and after the 
announcement of termination of such funds.  A Closed-End Fund (CEF) is a simple form of 
corporation which invests in a portfolio of various assets.  The shares of CEFs are traded in stock 
exchanges and are not redeemed or issued on demand.  Details of the investment portfolio is 
publicly disclosed quarterly with SEC and the value of the portfolio on a per share basis (known as 
“net asset value,” NAV) is computed daily and reported at least weekly in the financial press.  In an 
efficient market with rational investors, the share price of a CEF should equal its NAV, yet CEFs are 
often found to trade at prices that deviate from their NAVs. 
The deviation of CEF prices from the NAV - the discount
1, has long remained a puzzle.  
Gemmill and Thomas (2002) provide evidence that it is not unusual for CEFs to be trading at prices 
ranging from 5 percent above to 30 percent below their NAVs.  Early studies (i.e. Malkiel, 1977; 
Brauer, 1984) hypothesize that the exchange-traded prices are different from the reported NAV 
because of hidden costs such as capital gain tax liability, illiquidity of the portfolio, and agency costs.  
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) argue that such costs do not fluctuate much over short horizons 
while the CEF discounts fluctuate highly even on weekly interval; thus, the presence of hidden costs 
cannot provide sole explanation for the CEF discount. 
More recent explanations for the CEF discount include investor sentiment hypothesis (Lee, 
Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991), costly arbitrage hypothesis (Pontiff, 1996; Gemmill and Thomas, 2002), 
signaling hypothesis (Johnson, Lin, and Song, 2006), and managerial ability compensation 
hypothesis (Ross, 2002; Berg and Stanton, 2007).  Empirical tests of the first three hypotheses 
suggest specific variables that purport to explain the discounts.
2  These empirical tests in the 
literature focus on the level of CEF discounts in general.  While some studies (i.e. Brauer, 1984; 
                                                 
1  “Discount” is the difference between the exchange-traded price and the underlying per share value of 
the portfolio of the fund given by its net asset value (NAV).  The discount is positive if the price 
exceeds the NAV. 
 
2  Direct empirical tests for the managerial ability compensation hypothesis have not been reported. 
  2Brickley and Schallheim, 1985) document significant change in CEF discounts when the CEFs 
announce their intentions to terminate the fund,
 3 there is no empirical examination of how the 
explanatory power of the hypotheses changes upon such announcement.  Based on the arguments 
contained in the hypotheses, we believe that the relationship between the discount and the variables 
proposed by the theories are likely to change at the time of the announcement.  Thus, one of the 
objectives of our study is to examine how the explanatory power of the discount hypotheses 
changes subsequent to the termination announcement. 
1.1 Recent discount hypotheses applied to CEF termination announcement 
The investor sentiment hypothesis proposes that the discount is a mechanism by which CEF 
holders are compensated for the risk of their inability to sell the funds at the NAV, as noise traders 
become more pessimistic when CEF owners want to sell.  The liquidation date is usually announced 
shortly following the first termination announcement.  If noise traders are pessimistic during the 
period between announcement and actual liquidation, the holders of the soon-to-be liquidated CEFs 
could simply wait for the liquidation event and achieve better price outcome.
4  Also, if the holders of 
the CEFs must sell immediately, they should be able to do so at prices close to NAV since the 
buyers are also aware of the impending liquidation event.  Investors will bid up the price based on 
the knowledge that they will be soon paid an amount equal to the NAV less liquidation expenses.  
The noise trader risk should be greatly reduced upon the termination announcement, and 
consequently, the role of investor sentiments in the structure of CEF discounts should be greatly 
attenuated after the liquidation announcement. 
The costly arbitrage hypothesis posits that CEF discount exists because arbitrageurs do not 
adequately perform their roles in the presence of high transaction costs.  If the arbitrageurs or active 
shareholders want to purchase majority of the shares and liquidate the CEF, they will require high 
upfront investment.  Additionally, resistance from entrenched managers (see Bradley, Brav, 
                                                 
3  The term “open-ending” refers to any of the events that terminate a closed-end fund: liquidation of the 
fund, conversion to an open-end fund, or merger with an open-ended fund. 
 
4  This argument can also apply to open-ending of closed-end funds.  Subsequent to the open-ending of 
the closed-end fund, the fund holders are able to redeem the funds at the NAV price at a time of their 
choosing. 
  3Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007) will exacerbate the arbitrage costs as well as the probability of the 
failure of the strategy.  These costs would discourage arbitrageurs from disciplining the market.  In 
the presence of low costs, arbitrageurs may buy CEF shares and short sell the funds’ portfolio.  Lee 
et al (1991) argue that the dividend from the long position will entirely offset the dividend from the 
short position, enabling the investors to capture the discount as the arbitrage profit.  However, 
because the CEF portfolio may not be easily replicable and the fund manager can change the 
structure of the portfolio composition by active trading, the arbitrageurs may be unable to mimic their 
short portfolio appropriately.  And if the arbitrageurs must liquidate their short portfolio before the 
funds in their long portfolio are terminated, they are exposed to the risk that the discount may widen 
by the time they liquidate the portfolio.  These costs of arbitrage may discourage arbitrageurs from 
disciplining the markets. 
Subsequent to the termination announcement it is expected that the arbitrage costs would be 
somewhat mitigated leading to weaker explanatory power over the remaining discount.  Subsequent 
to the announcement, arbitrageurs do not require large upfront investment or buy majority of the 
funds or convince shareholders to liquidate the funds.  Further, they are unlikely to face resistance 
from entrenched managers.  Third, since the holding period is relatively short, the arbitrage strategy 
is easier and less risky to undertake.  In other words, arbitrage strategies are less costly and much 
easier to conduct; hence, the portion of discount due to costly arbitrage should be greatly reduced 
after the termination announcement. 
The signaling hypothesis argues that CEF discount exists due to asymmetric information 
between fund managers and investors.  CEFs that commit to pay high dividends send a signal to 
investors about their superior performance.  Prior to the termination announcement, the holding 
period can be infinite and returns on investing in closed-end funds mainly rely on future performance 
of the funds.  A good signal about future performance of the funds is therefore necessary.  However, 
after termination announcement, the fund holding period becomes relatively short.  The value of the 
CEF is less due to future performance of the funds, but more based on the current portfolio value.  
The signal assumes lower importance because investor will soon receive the liquidation value of the 
CEF portfolio. 
  4Brauer (1984) and Brickley and Schallheim (1985) documents that CEF discounts 
significantly shrink when CEFs announce open-ending the funds.  Most of the discount shrinkage is 
accounted by the adjustment of the fund price while the NAV of the funds is relatively unchanged.  
Both Brauer (1984) and Brickley and Schallheim (1985) focus on explaining cross-section variation 
of the CEF abnormal returns at termination announcements but they do not focus on the changes in 
theoretical links between the CEF discount and its theory-based explanatory variables.  In this 
paper, we examine the relationship between CEF discount and its theory-based variables before and 
after termination announcement.  We focus mainly on the three theories; the investor sentiment 
hypothesis, the costly arbitrage hypothesis, and the dividend signal hypothesis, because the proxy 
variables employed in the tests of the theories have been shown to have high degree of explanatory 
power. 
Our paper contributes to existing literature from several perspectives.  First, we update the 
results of abnormal returns on CEF termination announcement events.  To our knowledge, the last 
study is by Brauer (1984) and Brickley and Schallheim (1985) both of which are more than two 
decades old and were based on relatively small samples of CEFs.  Second, we examine the 
explanatory power of the three recent theories on CEF discounts.  Third, we document potential 
changes in the relationship between the CEF discount and the three hypotheses and empirically 
compare the relation before and after termination announcements. 
1.3 Summary of main findings  
Our main findings, based on a large sample of 119 CEF termination announcements, are as 
follows.  First, CEF discount shrinks by 6 percent, on average, from 12.32 percent on the week 
before to 6.23 percent during the week after the announcements.  Seconds, we find significant 
abnormal returns to the stock on the termination announcement day and the following day.  The 
cumulative average abnormal return for the two days is about 6.59 percent, indicating that the 
adjustment of share prices account entirely for the discount shrinkage.  Third, the explanatory 
variables based on the investor sentiment, the dividend signaling hypothesis, the costly arbitrage 
argument, and the tax liability provide good explanatory power in the cross-section analysis of 
  5discount prior to the termination announcement with a total R
2 of approximately 49% with the control 
variables accounting for approximately 25%. 
Subsequent to the announcement, however, the explanatory power of these variables 
declines.  The magnitude of the coefficients reduces roughly by half and becomes less statistically 
significant.  Fourth, the abnormal returns are driven by the prevailing discount: - high discount funds 
provide higher abnormal returns.  On average, every one percent in discount generates 0.47 percent 
in abnormal returns.  Most of the discount-generated abnormal return comes from the portion of the 
discount that is unexplained by our theory-based explanatory variables.  And lastly, the CEF 
discount becomes less correlated with aggregate discount after the termination announcement. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss applicable 
literature on closed-end fund discounts. There is a large body of literature but we focus on some of 
the more relevant papers. We discuss the open-ending process and the data in section 3.  We 
discuss the explanatory variables for discounts and their measurement in section 4.  We present 
cross-sectional analysis of the discounts based on variables suggested in the recent literature in 
section 5.  We present the regression based results and the time-series analysis of discounts in the 
same section. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Prior literature on CEF discounts 
The time series evolution of the CEF discounts is a puzzling phenomenon.  Lee et al. (1991) 
summarize that CEFs start out by being traded at premium of almost 10 percent at the time of their 
initial public offerings (Weiss, 1989; Peavy, 1990) and over a relatively short time span of 120 days 
the discount is of the order of 10 percent (Weiss, 1989).  Furthermore, CEF discounts fluctuate 
widely over time and exhibit mean reverting pattern (Sharpe and Sosin, 1975).  When CEFs 
announce liquidation or open-ending, the discount shrinks and continues to shrink thereafter 
(Brauer, 1984; Brickley and Schallheim, 1985). 
Earlier studies have proposed three possible explanations for CEF discount: agency costs, 
capital gain tax liability, and illiquidity of the assets.  The agency costs explanation argues that 
management fees do not correctly compensate for the service the fund management provides.  The 
  6management fee may be too high or too low compared to the realized fee charged, reflecting in 
discount or premium (see Lee et al. 1991; Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee, 1995; Berg and Stanton, 2007).  
Alternatively, the agency costs could be in forms of private benefit or perks extracted by entrenched 
managers (see Brauer, 1984; Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff, 1993).  The capital gain tax liability 
explanation argues that capital gain tax liability is not included in calculation of NAV so NAV 
overstates its real net asset value. 
There are two hypotheses that correspond to illiquidity of the fund assets (Lee et al. 1991).  
First, restricted stock hypothesis suggests that NAVs are overvalued because CEFs hold some 
restricted securities whose market values are lower than similar assets with no restriction.  Second, 
block discount hypothesis suggests that NAVs are calculated using marginal share price; however, 
the proceeds from liquidating the funds may be smaller than NAVs because of the impact of the 
large trade.  The tax liability and illiquidity of the assets arguments imply miscalculation of NAV.  
Malkiel (1977) finds these variables help explain cross-sectional variation in CEF discount. 
The three explanations provide some explanatory power of CEF discount in cross-section 
analysis; however, CEF discounts also display high cross-sectional correlation and high degree of 
fluctuation over time.  Lee et al. (1991) propose investor sentiment hypothesis to explain the time 
variation in CEF discounts.  The investor sentiment hypothesis states that CEFs are mostly traded 
by small investors and the fluctuation in the sentiment of the small (noise) traders can lead to 
fluctuation in demand for and share price of CEFs.  Because rational investors may not be able to 
resale CEF shares at the fundamental price if noise traders are pessimistic at the time to resale and 
because the sentiments are correlated among noise traders, the sentiment risk is systematic and 
must be compensated in terms of a discount. 
Costly arbitrage is another reason for CEF discounts (see Bodurtha et al., 1995; Pontiff, 
1996; and Gemmill and Thomas, 2002).  In a complete market, discount cannot be persistent as 
arbitrage activities force price back to its intrinsic value.  However, if arbitrage is costly, arbitrage 
profit can be too little to motivate arbitrageurs to act.  And price can drift away from its fundamental.  
Gemmill and Thomas (2002) argue that costly arbitrage allows discount to wander in the range of -5 
  7to 30 percent.  Gemmill and Thomas (2002) and Pontiff (1996) report that funds that are more 
difficult to arbitrage tend to have larger discounts. 
Johnson, Lin, and Song (2006) proposed that the CEF discount results from information 
asymmetry between fund managers and fund investors.  They find the discount is related to the 
commitment to dividend payout, supporting a dividend signaling hypothesis.  Ross (2002) and Berk 
and Stanton (2007) propose that the existence of the discount is to compensate for managerial 
ability.  Bradley, Brav, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) suggest that the CEF discount is endogenously 
related to the shareholder activism.  Funds with large discount are more susceptible to activists who 
profit from buying and liquidating large-discount CEFs.  However, the level of activism can be 
expected ex ante.  The market prices reflecting the expectation lead to discount shrinkage.  
Wermers, Wu, and Zechner (2007) propose a similar argument that lagged discount representing 
poor fund performance helps predict the fund manager replacement and markets expectation of the 
replacement would lead to reduced fund discount. 
Other related literature in the area of CEF discount shows that fund discount is negatively 
related to future return on the fund price, violating market efficiency hypothesis (Pontiff, 1995).  
Pontiff (1997) finds that monthly returns on fund price are about 64 percent more volatile than 
monthly returns on fund asset value, violating rational investor hypothesis.  Khorana, Servaes, and 
Wedge (2007) find that fund performance is positively related to the percentage of ownership held by 
fund managers.  Chan, Jain, and Xia (2008) report that discount of country funds is related to the 
differences between the illiquidity of markets that the fund invests in and the market in which the 
fund is traded. 
We hypothesize that the cross-sectional difference in CEF discount due to sentiment risk and 
costly arbitrage become smaller and this is reflected in form of abnormal returns at the liquidation 
announcement.  Lee et al. (1991) argue that fluctuation in noise traders’ sentiment can affect 
demand for CEFs and their prices.  Because sentiment risk can be correlated among noise traders, 
rational investors may not be able to sell CEFs at the fundamental price.  Holding CEFs to wait for 
better price can be costly since the investors’ opportunity costs are high and the sentiment risk can 
be persistent.  Such a risk must be incorporated into the fund price. 
  8The risk, however, is attenuated by the impending liquidation event as investors expect to 
unload the CEF shares at the NAV at the liquidation date.  Costly arbitrage makes arbitraging 
activities less attractive, allowing CEFs to trade at price deviating from NAV.  Arbitrage activities are 
costly requiring large investment to buy majority of shares for to enable fund liquidation and are 
further exacerbated in presence of management resistance (see Bradley et al., 2007).  However, at 
the liquidation announcement, arbitrage costs are greatly reduced due to lower capital needs, lower 
probability of management resistance, and smaller transaction costs. 
 
3. Data  
3.1 The termination process 
In a typical open-ending, the board of directors requests a proposal from the management.  
Once the board approves the restructuring proposal, shareholders vote is sought.  Subsequent to 
the board’s vote, a date for shareholders vote is established.  The shareholder vote is typically 
scheduled one to three months following the board action.  In case not enough shareholders votes 
are cast the date for shareholder vote is postponed.  While news about the boards’ vote is often 
released in news wire, it does not constitute a termination announcement which we define as one 
that follows shareholder vote.  At that time, the terms and conditions of open-endings are often 
declared.  Open-ending usually occurs in a period three to six months after tthe announcement. 
Alternative to the management inititated proposal, the fund may announce that according to 
the fund's prospectus a shareholder vote on open-ending is triggered in the event that a sufficiently 
large discount exists for a specified time period. An example is provided in the following statement 
contained in the announcement by the Dessauer Global Equity Fund: 
“…The Fund’s prospectus provides that after 18 months from the date of the fund’s 
initial public offering, the fund will automatically convert to an open-end investment 
company if its shares close at a market price that is at a 5% or greater discount to 
the net asset value of the fund on the last business day of any week and for each of 
the next 14 business days.” (LexisNexis Archives, Open-ending Announcement, 
January 6, 1999). 
 
There are certain drawbacks to reorganizing the closed-end fund into an open-ended entity. 
The legal structure of closed-end funds provides a stable asset base.  This enables the manager of 
  9the closed-end fund to make longer-term investment decisions based on the fund’s investment 
strategy without being unduly affected by the shareholders’ buying or selling sentiments or activities, 
or being overly concerned about potential redemption considerations.  Conversely, open-end funds 
tend to have a fluctuating asset base due to purchase and redemption requests by shareholders.  
Therefore, investor sentiment might affect the portfolio structure rather than the investment 
philosophy of the fund. Another disadvantage of converting into an open-end fund is that closed-end 
funds can add leverage to their portfolio whereas open-end funds do not have such opportunities. 
Furthermore, closed-end funds are better able to direct more investments into illiquid securities 
compared to open-ended mutuals.
5 
3.2 Descriptive sample statistics 
A sample of 119 closed-end funds that announce terminating the fund during 1973 to 2006 
period are hand-collected from Lexus/Nexus database.  We also hand collect financial data (i.e. 
expense ratio, fund turnover ratio, unrealized appreciation, total asset value, etc.) from the fund’s 
latest financial statement (N30D) prior to the announcement date from Edgar database.  NAV data 
are collected Bloomberg system and if the data are not available, we obtain NAV data from the Wall 
Street Journal (WSJ).  Share price and dividend payout data are collected from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
We report the distribution of the sample in Table 1.  Panel A shows the frequency distribution 
by year and Panel B reports frequency distribution by fund types.  Out of the 119 funds, 23 funds 
were liquidated during 1973 to 1990 period, an average of about one fund per year.  A larger number 
of CEFs were liquidated after 1990, particularly during the 1996 to 2000 period.  About 58 percent of 
our sample is domestic funds and 47 percent is bond funds. 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
3.3 CEF discount behavior preceding the open-ending announcement. 
The NAV data are reported at different frequency.  In the Bloomberg system, some funds 
report daily NAV while others report monthly NAV.  In both Bloomberg and WSJ, some funds report 
                                                 
5  Deli and Varma (2002) examine the choice of organizational form for investment funds and report that 
closed-end funds tend to hold less liquid securities and their security prices are less transparent than 
that of open-ended funds. 
  10NAV on Friday while others report on Wednesday.  To ensure that the discount is computed 
properly, we match the NAV with the share price from CRSP by date and calculate discount.  Then, 














         ( 1 )  
We examine the behavior of funds’ price, NAV, and discount over time by creating an 
artificial portfolio.  We invest a hypothetical amount of $100 in each fund at the inception date, one 
year prior to announcement.  The number of shares of each fund at the inception is used as the 
weight for subsequent NAV and value calculations of the portfolio.  We plot the temporal behavior of 
portfolio price and NAV from one year before to one year after the announcement.  The primary 
takeaway from this figure is the behavior of the discounts.  
Figure 1 suggests that the NAV and price tend to be stable and are highly correlated prior to 
the termination announcement.  At announcement, the plot of NAV does not drop significantly price 
exhibits upward adjustment toward NAV.  As sample funds are open-ended or liquidated they drop 
out of the artificial portfolio and the price and NAV series decline following the announcement as 
CEFs are open-ended or liquidated. 
We show a plot of the average discount along with the 95 percent confidence interval Figure 
2.  The portfolio implicit in the average discount calculation contains one share of each fund in 
contrast to the artificial portfolio with varying weights in Figure 1.  We note that there is a significant 
discount shrinkage from 12 percent at one week before the announcement to 6 percent at one week 
after the announcement (see also Table 4).  We find that the level of discount tends to decline 
approximately three months prior to the announcement, possibly based on market’s anticipation of 
the termination announcement. 
Termination process was as quick as three days for some funds while it took more than one 
year for some funds.  Eighty-eight funds were liquidated within 30 weeks.  The discount during the 
first 20 weeks shows a slow downward trend with more fluctuations thereafter.  Fluctuations may be 
due to less reliable statistics as more funds drop out.  Secondly, some funds may experience higher 
NAV returns on their portfolio.  Third, since the liquidation date is often not stated at the time of the 
  11announcement, the fund managers may have incentives to prolong the liquidation date if favorrable 
conditions arise
6.  In the event of uncertainty regarding liquidation date, discount may begin to 
bounce back.  Price and NAV after week 20 in shown Figures 1 suggest that NAV does show some 
small spikes in our series.  We also find that for some weeks, share price drops at a faster pace than 
does NAV.  In the next section, we conduct an empirical test for abnormal returns at the termination 
announcement using an event study approach. 
<< Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here >> 
3.4 Share price response to announcement 
To test if the termination announcements generate abnormal return on the CEF share price, 
we employ a standard event study approach.  The open-ending announcement date is treated day 
zero in event time.  We estimate the market model using price returns.  The estimation period is from 
–250 to –21, and the market model is estimated with CRSP equally weighted index.
7  The abnormal 
returns, , is defined as the difference between the realized returns and the expected returns 
based on the estimated parameters from the market model:
  
t i AR ,
  t m i i t i t i R R AR , , ,               ( 2 )  
The average abnormal returns by different portfolios are computed across event dates.  The 
cross-section average daily abnormal return is obtained by fund type and various sub-samples (not 
reported).  The test statistic is a z-statistic.  We also report a non-parametric test of signficance of 
abnormal returns based on the proportions of funds exhibiting positive returns.
8 
                                                 
6  CEF managers may prolong liquidation date due to several reasons.  To receive better price they may 
slowly sell their portfolio rather than conduct fire sales of their assets.  Second, managers may delay 
liquidation to enhance management fee income.  Third, managers may prolong the liquidation time if 
their portfolios perform well due to favorable market conditions following the announcement. 
 
7  Our results are robust when we employ the CRSP value weighted index. To the extent that the share of 
a closed-end fund responds to the broad market movement, irrespective of the nature of the fund, our 
use of the CRSP index is reasonable. Even though there is a possibility of an omitted index in the 
context of international funds and bonds funds by only using the CRSP index, Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee 
(1995) show that closed-end fund prices are correlated to the market where the funds are traded 
rather than the market where the funds’ underlying assets are traded. 
 
8  The binomial z-statistic is: () [ ( 1 ) ] z PPOS p p p N    / , where  is the percentage of positive 
observations, 
PPOS
p is the expected percentage positive (50%) under the null, and  N is the sample size. 
  12We report the average abnormal returns and their associated statistics in Table 2.  We show 
a plot of the average abnormal returns against days relative to the termination announcement day in 
Figure 3.  The average abnormal returns at termination announcement date and one day after are 
positive, respectively at 3.72 and 2.87 percent,.and are highly statistically significant.  About 76 (66) 
percent of our sampled CEFs exhibit positive abnormal returns on the announcement day (the day 
after the announcement day).  The cumulative average abnormal return on the two days is 
approximately 6.59 percent, which is about the size of the discount shrinkage documented in the 
previous section.  This suggests that on average the adjustment of share price is responsible entirely 
to the shrinkage of discount and NAV does not adjust in response to the termination announcement.  
Our results are consistent with those of Brauer (1984) and Brickley and Schallheim (1985) where the 
sample sizes were substantially smaller respectively at 14 and 10 closed-end funds.  We conclude 
that markets react to the termination announcements of our sampled closed-end funds. 
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
 
4. Variables that explain discounts 
4.1 Explanatory variables 
Earlier studies have focused on specific variables to explain cross-sectional variations in 
discounts.  We incorporate all the useful variables from earlier studies in a regression of the pre-
announcement discount.  Subsequently, we examine the change in the coefficients between pre-
announcement and post-announcement discounts. 
As we presented earlier, investor sentiment is considered in the literature to have bearing on 
the discount.  Aggregate discount is used as a proxy for investor sentiment.  Following Lee et al. 
(1991), we compute weekly NAV-weighted average discount of all closed-end funds available on the 
Bloomberg system.  Prior to 1990, there are only a few CEFs available on the Bloomberg system; 
consequently, the cross-sectional regressions do not employ data prior to 1990.  All available CEFs 
are classified by types: foreign versus domestic and bond versus equity funds.  We match the 
aggregated discount sorted by type, and week to our sample.  The variable, INVS, is expected to be 
positively related to the level of discount. 
  13Based on signaling hypothesis, Johnson et al. (2006) suggest dividend yield can be a good 
signal about superior future performance to investors.   Also Pontiff (1996) argues high dividend 
payout helps lowering arbitrage costs.  Thus, dividend yield is a proxy for the signaling hypothesis.  
The variable is named SIGH. We calculate dividend yield using the dividend payout during week -52 
to week -2 preceding the announcement.  The variable SIGH is expected to have a negative 
coefficient when regressed on discount.     
Early studies have suggested agency costs as an explanation for the discount.  High level of 
expense ratio is one manifestation of the agency problem.  Recent literature (Ross, 2002) suggests 
a positive link between the variable and the discount.  However, Berk and Stanton (2007) caution 
that the relation may not be easy to observe due to unobservable managerial ability.  Gemmill and 
Thomas (2002) also report that expense ratio is positively related to discount.  We obtain the fund’s 
expense ratio (EXPR) and expect it to be positively related to discount. 
High transaction costs are an impediment to successful arbitrage that could eliminate or 
reduce the size of the discount.  Following Pontiff (1996), we use the inverse of share price as a 
proxy for transaction cost.  The higher the transaction cost, the less likely arbitrageurs will be active.  
We expect inverse price capturing transaction costs, TRNS, to be positively related to discount. 
Portfolio uniqueness is a measure of how difficult it is to replicate a CEF portfolio.  An index 
fund, for example, is easily replicated by investors and is therefore unlikely to trade at significant 
discount.  The more unique the fund is, the higher its discount is likely to be. The standard deviation 
of the regression residuals is proposed by Pontiff (1996) and Gemmill and Thomas (2002) as a 
proxy for uniqueness of CEF’s portfolio.  Based on the costly arbitrage argument, the more unique 
the portfolio, the more difficult it is to replicate the portfolio and hence arbitrage is more costly.  
Because discount is higher in the presence of arbitrage costs, the more unique a portfolio is the 
higher the discount.  We regress the weekly NAV of each CEF on a set of broad indices, depending 
on the CEFs is domestic/foreign and bond/equity status.  The estimation period is from week -53 to 
week -2, relative to the announcement week.  The standard deviation of the regression residual 
provides the portfolio uniqueness measure, PRTU. 
  14Asset illiquidity provides an indication of the possible lacks of quality of assets.  Highly illiquid 
asset portfolios may have stale and unreliable NAVs.  Early studies (i.e. Malkiel, 1977) suggest that 
discount is related the illiquidity of the portfolio.  The higher the turnover ratio, the more liquid the 
portfolio is.  Thus, we expect negative relation between this variable and DISC.  The log turnover 
ratio of the fund portfolio is the measure of asset illiquidity, ASTI.     
Trading illiquidity of the shares is associated with higher discounts.  Chan et al. (2008) find 
that liquidity of the markets where the CEF shares are traded is related to CEF discount.  Similar to 
Chan et al. (2008), we measure trading illiquidity using Amihud’s (2002) measure.  We denote the 
illiquidity measure, TRDI, and expect a positive relationship between this variable and discount. 
Early studies have suggested that discount is a function of capital gain tax liability.  Because 
the unrealized capital gain of a fund is a future tax liability to a new investor, he buys the fund at a 
discount from the NAV reflecting the future capital gain tax.  Thus, the size of unrealized capital gain 
is positively related to the discount.  The unrealized appreciation (divided by total asset value) is 
obtained from the financial statements and named as TAXL.  We provide a brief summary of the 
explanatory variables in Table 3. 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
Our explanatory variables are chosen based on the previous earlier literature and have 
theoretical bases as discussed above.  In addition to these variables we also employ a number of 
control variables.  Fund’s total asset in log is named SIZE.   Fund’s AGE is the log of the age of the 
fund in the CRSP listing and possibly underestimates the actual age.  
The type of the fund is an important determinant of the level of discount.  We classify funds 
as FOREIGN, a dummy variable that takes on a value of one, if the fund’s assets are primarily 
foreign bonds or stocks.  Country funds, global, and international funds belong to this type.  Based 
on the asset type we employ two dummy variables, EQUITY, which takes a value of one if the fund 
is primarily invested in equity, and DUAL takes a value of one if the fund is dual-purpose fund (zero 
otherwise).  We also employ the trading venue as a control.  NYSE is a dummy variable taking a 
value of one if the fund is traded in New York stock exchanges (zero otherwise).   
  15The discount series exhibits cycles.  We try to capture the potential time-series differences 
by roughly dividing our sample by three periods.  Correspondingly D1998 is a dummy variable taking 
value of one if the fund is terminated prior to 1998 fund (zero otherwise).  D2003 is a dummy 
variable taking value of one if the fund is terminated after 1998 but prior to 2003 (zero otherwise). 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
As mentioned earlier, a proxy for our investor sentiment is limited to post 1990.  In addition, 
some variables from the financial statement are not available.  This reduces our sample size to 102 
funds.  Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.  In the first panel, we provide some pre-
announcement statistics, followed by post-announcement results, and some general  
In the first panel, we observe that the mean (median) fund discount on the week before 
announcement is 12.32 percent (10.98).  It is larger than that of the aggregated discount by 
approximately 4 percent, which has a mean (median) of 8.72 percent (6.30).  The standard 
deviations of the two discount series are similar.  The larger mean fund discount suggests that the 
prevailing higher discount on the sampled funds is one reason for these funds to undertake open-
ending or termination.  
During the post-announcement week, as shown in Panel 2, the average (median) fund 
discount drops to 6.23 percent (5.36) whereas the aggregated discount in the post-announcement 
period is similar to the pre-period.  The inverse share price and the dividend yield series in the pre- 
and post-announcement period exhibit similar mean and dispersion.  It is notable that the dividend 
yield is approximately 7 percent for the funds.  The CAR during the two day period for the sampled 
102 funds is 6.46 percent and is of magnitude very similar to that of the whole sample of 119 funds.  
The median of 5.44 percent suggests that the CAR is not unduly influenced by extreme observations 
as the minimum and maximum of the distribution bear out. 
The distributions of NAV Residual σ and ILLIQ are highly skewed.  In our regressions, we 
take the log transformation of these variables.  The expense ratio is less than 2 percent.  Variables 
such as transaction costs, dividend yield, and unrealized gains contain some extreme values and, as 
hence, are winsorized for subsequent analysis.  
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
  16Because the structure of CEF discounts may differ by fund types, we classify our sampled 
funds into foreign/domestic and bond/equity.  For each class, the mean of each variable is reported 
in Table 5.  The two sample t-test for difference in means is reported in the last six columns of the 
Table.  For example, “y” in row Fund Discount and column “2-1” indicates that the mean discount of 
domestic bond funds (1) is statistically different (at 5 percent confidence level) from the mean 
discount of foreign bond funds (2).   
The discount of our sampled funds differs by fund types: domestic funds tend to have higher 
discount than foreign funds.  The discount for domestic bond funds is unusually high, given the 
common knowledge that bond funds are less risky and traded at lower discount.  We compare our 
fund discount to aggregate discount.  We notice that the average discount of our sampled bond 
funds is about three times as large as the average aggregated discount of comparable bond funds in 
general.  The discount for equity funds between the sample and the aggregate is more comparable.  
Thus, the notion that high discount funds are likely to be terminated is supported for bond funds but 
remains unclear in equity funds.   
The average standard deviation of the NAV residual for equity funds is higher than that for 
bond funds, suggesting that portfolios of equity funds are more difficult to replicate and are riskier 
than those of bond funds.  The average expense ratio for the domestic equity funds is higher than 
other groups.  Equity funds also tend to have lower share price (higher Inverse Share Price) than 
domestic funds.  Average dividend yield and illiquidity measure (ILLIQ) do not differ across groups.   
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
 
5. Regression results 
5.1 Cross-sectional regression specification 
Our cross-sectional estimation consists of three regressions.  First, we estimate cross-
sectional regression using discount prevailing at one week before the announcements.   Second, we 
repeat the cross-sectional regression using the discount at one week post-announcement.  Because 
most of the explanatory variables are slow changing and do not change within the two weeks time 
period, they are re-used in the second step regression, except that we re-compute the dividend 
  17yield, inverse price, and aggregated discount for the post-announcement period.  Finally, to obtain 
the difference of the coefficients in first and second steps, we pool the two regression datasets 
together and employ a dummy variable (indicating whether discount is before or after 
announcement) to interact with each of the explanatory variables.  The regression standard errors 
are robust using White (1980)’s method.   The regression results are summarized in Table 6.   
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Where DISCi is discount of the closed-end fund.  INVS is the investor sentiment hypothesis 
variable captured by the aggregated discount.  SIGH is the signaling hypothesis variable captured 
via the dividend yield.  EXPR is the expense ratio variable that captures the agency cost. TRNS is 
the inverse of the trading price and captures the transaction cost hypothesis.  PRTU is the portfolio 
uniqueness measure and captured by the NAV residual σ.  ASTI is the portfolio level illiquidity 
captured by the turnover.  TRDI is the trading illiquidity of the fund shares in the market.  TAXL is the 
measure of unrealized gains as a percent of total assets and captures the potential tax liability.  The 
series of X variables are the control variables and include; size, age of the fund, type of fund 
(equity/dual/bond) or foreign/domestic funds.  The trading exchange variable is NYSE and there are 
three years of announcement dummy variables. 
<< Insert Table 6 about here >> 
5.2 Cross-sectional regression results 
The cross-sectional regressions are presented in Table 6, in three panels.  In Panel A, we 
show the results with discount at one week before the announcement as the dependent variable. 
Consistent with the predications in theory and as summarized in Table 3, all coefficients exhibit 
expected signs. The aggregate discount or investor sentiment hypothesis shows positive and highly 
significant coefficient, consistent with Lee et al. (1991) that CEF discount is highly correlated with the 
aggregated discount.   The time variation in the systematic component of discount is captured by the 
aggregated discount variable. 
Transaction cost has positive coefficient indicating that the higher the transaction costs the 
less likely that arbitrage will take place leading to higher discount.  Signaling hypothesis based on 
  18dividend yield exhibits negative coefficient significant at better than 5 percent level.  Higher dividend 
payout provides a better signal about superior performance of the funds and, hence, the lower the 
discount. The portfolio uniqueness measure is positive and statistically significant at 10 percent 
level, supporting the hypothesis that the more unique the portfolio, the most costly it is to conduct 
arbitrage and the greater the level of discounts.  The potential for tax liability captured in the 
unrealized appreciation variable is positive and weakly significant.  We do not find expense ratio, 
turnover and illiquidity to be statistically significant.  Among the control variables, only the dummy 
corresponding to equity type of funds is significant and negative. 
The explanatory power, measured by the R
2, is quite high at 0.49.  In a separate analysis, 
not reported, we find that the R
2 is about 0.25 with only control variables in the regression.  This 
means, about 25 percent of the explanatory power comes from our focal variables, which is quite 
high.  Investor sentiment, arbitrage, signaling, and capital gains tax liability hypotheses provide 
explanatory power for CEF discount, especially for closed-end funds announcing termination.  
When we use post-announcement discount as the dependent variable, the results are 
somewhat different as shown in Panel B of Table 6.  Most of the variables remain statistically 
significant but the coefficients are smaller roughly by half.  Overall results suggest that risk structure 
of CEFs changes by the termination announcement.  When we examine the difference between the 
coefficients as shown in Panel C, the differential response to the investor sentiment variable, i.e., 
aggregated discount, is positive and significant.  That is, there is a substantially muted response to 
the aggregated discount in the post-announcement period.  The CEF discount becomes less 
sensitive to these explanatory variables after the termination announcement.   
5.3 Relationship between discounts and abnormal returns 
It is natural to ask how much the discount is accounted for the abnormal returns observed in 
the previous section.  To investigate this question, we calculate the cumulate abnormal return (CAR) 
over the two-day period and estimate the following regression. 
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  19 Where  DISCi is the discount observed one week prior to the announcement and CARi is the 
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The idea is that for a fund that is traded at x percent discount, the required return to eliminate 
the discount is [x / (100-x)] percent.  Thus, a fund trading at 20% discount needs to experience a 
25% abnormal return to fully remove the discount, i.e. trade at par with the NAV.  Thus, we would 
expect that the coefficient attached to DISC
* should be 1 if the announcement fully removes the 
discount. To the extent that the discount is not immediately erased, the coefficient is a measure of 
the speed of adjustment of the discount.   
We insert the days-to-open ending as a variable of interest.  If the market expectation is of a 
very short liquidation process then the CAR is likely to be higher. The coefficient on open-ending 
days (log) is not statistically significant.  The reason is that in most cases, CEFs announce only the 
termination event but do not specify the termination date.  Markets cannot predict this ex ante and 
are unable to incorporate into prices.  The control variables employed are similar to the earlier 
regressions reported. 
The coefficient of the discount is positive and highly statistically significant as shown in Panel 
A of Table 7.  Because discount is at one week prior to the announcement while the abnormal 
returns are at the announcement, we can interpret this result as a causal effect.  On average, every 
one percent of discount (at one week prior to the announcement) generates 0.47 percent of 
abnormal returns at the announcement date, holding other things unchanged.  The result suggests 
that about 47 percent of CEF discount is due to uncertainty about open ending date.  After the CEFs 
announce the termination policy, markets rebate a portion of the discount back in terms of abnormal 
return.  Another 57 percent of the discount is not eliminated at the announcement period. 
An alternative view of discount is that it has a structural component and an idiosyncratic 
component.  Discount can be is decomposed into explained discount and unexplained discount.  
Systematic discount is the portion of discount that can be explained by the explanatory variables in 
the last section and unexplained discount is simple the residual from the above regression (using 
  20discount at one week prior to the announcement as dependent variable).  Based on the regression in 
Panel A, we estimate the systematic and the unsystematic discounts and transform each discount to 
an expected return using equation (5).  
In the second specification, we decompose the closed-end fund discounts into two 
components - a systematic and an idiosyncratic component. The systematic component is the 
predictable part of discount based on the type of the fund, its trading pattern, liquidity, risk, age since 
inception, and similar variables. The idisyncratic part of discount is the difference between the 
observed discount and the predictable component of discount. The abnormal return response at the 
time of the announcement is related to the size of the discount as we have shown in Panel A – the 
larger the pre-announcement discount the higher the announcement period abnormal returns.  
**
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In the regression specification, PDISC
* and RDISC
* are the predicated and the residual 
discount by CEF.  We present evidence in Panel B that at the time of the announcement, the 
abnormal return responds to close the idiosyncratic discount rapidly with a coefficeint of 0.744. 
However, only a smaller part of the sytematic discount 0.398, is eliminated at that time. The 
remaining part of the systematic discount is subsequently eliminated or reduced by the date of open-
ending.  The difference between the two coefficients is 0.346 and the t-statistical is 3.76, statistically 
significance at 1 percent level. 
<< Insert Table 7 about here >> 
In summary, the regression results suggest the following.  First, that discounts do respond to 
hypothesized variables in the predicted manner.  Second, the reductions in the discounts post-
announcement are largely due to the reduction in the residual part of the discount and less due to 
reductions in the predicted part.  Third, post-announcement the relationships with the variables get 
weaker with the strongest drop in the investor sentiment, or aggregated discount, coefficient. 
5.4 Time series behavior of discounts 
Lee et al. (1991) argue that the risk from holding a CEF consists of two parts; the risk arising 
from fund’s portfolio and noise trader risk. Noise trader risk is the risk that fund holders may not be 
  21able to sell the fund at a reasonable price because noise trader becomes pessimistic.  In addition, 
the noise trader risk is symmetric because sentiments of investors are correlated.  As we argued 
earlier, the noise trader risk could decline with the termination announcement.  In the last section, we 
show that the sensitivity of the discount declines after the announcement.  In this section, we provide 
additional results to strengthen this conjecture. 
We perform additional two tests.  First, for each of our sampled fund, we run the following 
time-series regression.   
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 Where  DISCi,t is the discount of funds i
th in week t; INVSt is the aggregate discount at time t 
for an appropriately type-matched aggregated portfolio; and Ii,t is dummy variable taking value of one 
if t is at or after the announcement date.  Because discount is persistent but stationary, we include 
10 lagged discounts to account for potential autoregression.  We run this regression for each of the 
sampled funds.  The sample period is from one year before the announcement date to either one 
year after the announcement date or the termination date or the liquidation date if it is earlier.  As we 
have discussed, for CEFs that prolong their termination event, the discounts could reverse to the 
pre-announcement level due to increased uncertainty about the termination date.   
The null hypothesis is that sensitivity of the discount to aggregate discount does not change 
with the termination announcement.  And the alternative hypothesis, broadly supported by the cross-
sectional ergressions, is that the sensitivity declines after announcement.   
0 : 2 0   H  versus    0 : 2   A H  
Based on one regression for each CEF, we summarize the behavior of the sample average 
of the coefficient in Table 8.  Note that the termination announcement dates differ across funds, i.e., 
there is no clustering of the announcements.  Hence, the cross-sectional correlation of the estimated 
coefficients is of little concern and the t-tests as reported are robust.  However, we also report the 
non-parametric sign test and sign rank tests of the coefficients.   
  In our sample, the sensitivity of discount to the aggregate discount declines after termination 
announcement.  The average  1  coefficient of the Investor sentiment variable, INVS, is 0.52 and it is 
  22statistically significantly different from zero at one percent level.  This provides an additional piece of 
evidence that the sampled fund discounts are responsive to the level of aggregate discount.  Of 
greater interest is the  2  coefficient.  The average  2   coefficient is -0.84 which is statistically 
significantly different from zero.  This provides evidence suggesting that the sensitivity of the 
discount to aggregate discount declines subsequent to the termination announcement.  
Additional insight can be provided by estimating the following cross-section regressions.  
,0 1 t i DISC INVS v            ( 8 )   it
  For each week from [-52, 52], we run cross-section regression of 103 funds.  We plot the 
1  coefficient along with its 95 percent confidence interval in Figure 4.  Prior to the termination 
announcements, the  1   coefficient is positive and is statistically significant.  We observe a small 
downward slope, particularly following week -30.  The  1   coefficient drops noticeably on the 
announcement day and becomes not statistically significant different from zero after 12 weeks. 
Overall results suggest that sensitivity of the discount to aggregate discount declines after the 
termination announcement.   
<< Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here >> 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Closed-end fund discount has attracted considerable attention from practitioners and 
academic researchers. The discount appears to suggest the lack efficiencies in financial markets.  
Recently, researchers have sought to provide explanations relying on behavioral theory based 
notions such as investor sentiment index and others theoreies based on transaction costs and 
signalling hypothesis.  We consider a number of recent hypotheses in addition to the previously 
related hypotheses such as tax liability and illiquid assets in our assesment of discount.  
Existing evidence on open-ending of closed-end funds relies on two early studies with very 
small sample sizes of 14 firms. Using a sample of 119 U.S. CEFs open-ending announcements 
between 1973 and 2007, we document a significant average abnormal return of 6.59 percent during 
the announcement period. The average discounts of the closed-end funds in the sample is reduced 
  23  24
from a discount of 12.32 percent prior to the announcement to a discount of 6.23 percent following 
the termination announcement. 
The behavior of the closed-end prices during the open-ending process provides us with 
critical additional insight into the closed-end fund discount puzzle.  Cross-sectional analysis reveals 
that discount is related to the hypothesized variables in a predictable manner during the pre- and 
post-announcement periods.  The strength of the relationship of the variables reduces in the post-
announcement period with a signficant decline of the role of investor sentiment.  The announcement 
return is positively related to the size of the discount.  However, the greater part of the reduction in 
discount is due to idiosyncratic component compared to the systematic part.  Time series analysis of 
discounts also supports the weakening role of investor sentiments subsequent to the announcement. 
After the announcement, there remains a discount of 6.22%. Cross-sectional analysis 
reveals that this discount is larger for illiquid funds. Also, the volatility is negatively related to the 
post-announcement discount. If the volatility is inversely related to the reliability of the fund’s NAV, 
then the smaller reaction could be due to greater uncertainty about the liquidation value of the fund. 
Our subsequent research is going to focus on the role of price versus NPV in the gradual 
reduction of discounts.  Second, we observe a discount of 2.30 percent in the week prior to the 
termination which deserves closer scrutiny. It might be attributable to either NAV errors or delays in 
shareholders receiving the liquidating distribution. Further research should address the value of the 
actual distribution to the closed-end fund investors to verify whether this final discount represents 
errors in the reported NAVs or whether there are other costs such as redemption fees tacked on to 
the closed-end fund shares that may provide an explanation of the discount.  References 
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  Table 1 
Distribution of the sample of 119 Closed Ended Funds that announced open-ending in the 
period from 1973 to 2007. 
 
Panel A: Frequency distribution of open-ending announcement by year. 
Year Frequency 
1973 – 1980  7 
1981 – 1985  6 
1986 – 1990  8 
1991 – 1995  15 
1996 – 2000  44 
2001 – 2007  37 
Total 119 
 
Panel B:  Frequency distribution by fund types 
 Domestic  Foreign  Total 
Bond  40(34%) 4(3%) 44(37%) 
Equity  28(24%) 47(39%) 75(63%) 
Total  68(58%) 51(42%)  119(100%) 
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Table 2 
Average abnormal returns (AAR) for the sample of closed-end funds with the open-ending 
announcement as event date (day 0).  We estimate coefficients from a market model estimated 
over the period [-251,-21] with the equally-weighted CRSP index returns as market returns.  We 
show the abnormal portfolio return, z-statistics, percentage of positive and negative observations, 
and binomial z-statistics for positive abnormal returns in Panel A.  We present the cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAR) and the corresponding z-statistics in Panel B.  ***, **, * denote 











-10 -0.02% -0.29  43 -1.49   
-9 0.02% -0.23  47 -0.56   
-8 0.07% 0.68  47 -0.65   
-7 0.00% -0.75  49 -0.19   
-6 0.18% 1.09  50 -0.09   
-5 -0.01% -0.11  42 -1.76   
-4 -0.21% -1.24  36 -3.08 
***  
-3 0.13% 1.15  46 -0.85   
-2 -0.15% -0.53  41 -1.94 
** 
-1 0.01% 0.06  49 -0.19   
         
0 3.72% 37.77
***   76 5.71 
***  
1 2.87% 23.61
***   66 3.42 
***  
         
2 -0.08% -0.77  43 -1.57   
3 0.01% 0.35  46 -0.94   
4 -0.02% -0.75  45 -1.12   
5 0.12% 0.77  50 0.00   
6 0.02% -0.15  45 -1.03   
7 0.13% 0.52  47 -0.66   
8 -0.13% -0.62  45 -1.13   
9 -0.07% -0.89  45 -1.12   







(%)  z-statistic   
(-10, -1)  0.00% -0.05  
(0, 1)  6.59% 43.38
*** 
(2, 10)  0.04% -0.44  
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Table 3 
We summarize below some of explanatory variables used in closed-end fund discount studies. 
We present references to earlier studies, how the variables are measured, and the expected 
sign of the coefficient when the variables are regressed against discount.  In the regression 
there are other control variables such as size, age, time period, bond or equity fund, foreign or 








How the variable is 
measured  sign 
INVS  Investor 
sentiment  
Lee et al 
(1991) 
Aggregate of NAV-weighted discount of 
all close-ended funds each week. 
+ 




Dividend yield is a predictor of future 
performance. 
- 




Expense Ratio (%) of the fund.  + 
TRNS  Transaction 
costs  
Pontiff (1996)  1/price  + 





Standard deviation of the regression 
residual of the NAV time series of a fund 
against a corresponding broad index.  
+ 
ASTI  Asset  
Illiquidity 
Lee et al. 
(1991) 
Log(portfolio turnover ratio)  - 
TRDI  Trading 
illiquidity  
Chan et al 
(2008) 
Illiquidity measure as defined in Amihud 
(2002) 
+ 
TAXL  Tax liability    Unrealized appreciation as a  percent of 
total assets 
+   30
Table 4 
We present the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables below.  Data is available for 
102 closed-end funds.  Pre-announcement refers to the week before the announcement and 
post-announcement is the week after the announcement.  Fund discount is DISC.  Average of 
the matched aggregated discount is a measure of the investor sentiment (INV).  TRNS is the 
inverse of the share price. CAR refers to the two-day CAR over the -1 to 0 period.  PRTU is the 
portfolio uniqueness measure obtained as the standard deviation of regression residuals of 
each fund’s NAV against appropriate benchmark indices.  There are 47 foreign funds, 57 equity 
funds, and 14 dual funds. Eighty-two funds trade on NYSE.  There are 28 cases pre-1998 and 
55 cases between 1998 and 2003. 
  
Variables  N Mean Median St.Dev Min  Max 
Panel A 
Pre-announcement               
Fund Discount  102 12.32 10.98 6.63 1.60 37.84 
Aggregate Discount  102 8.72 6.30 6.98 -1.43 26.06 
Inverse Share Price
b 102 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.01  0.30 
Dividend Yield
b 102 6.94 6.54 4.69 0.00  20.00 
    
Panel B 
Post-announcement               
Fund Discount  102 6.23 5.36 4.33 -1.51 22.90 
Aggregate Discount  102 8.53 6.40 6.62 -1.32 25.65 
Inverse Share Price
b 102 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.01  0.30 
Dividend Yield
b 102 6.86 6.11 4.77 0.00  20.00 
    
Panel C 
General    
CAR 102 6.46 5.44 5.49 -5.47  32.12 
NAV residual σ  102 1.94 1.22 1.95 0.26 12.04 
Expense Ratio  102 1.49 1.33 0.69 0.45 3.53 
Asset Turnover (log)  102 3.44 3.73 1.45 -3.22 6.44 
Trading Illiquidity  102 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.68 
Unrealized Gains as 
% of total assets
a  102 3.84 2.39 18.54 -38.00 38.00 
Total Assets (log)  102 4.68 4.51 1.00 2.06  6.75 
Listing Age in CRSP 
(log)  102 2.08 2.14 0.75 0.69 3.61 
Number of Days to 
termination (log)  102 4.85 5.01 0.83 1.10 6.10 
 
 
a Winsorized at 5 and 95 percentile 
b Winsorized at 95 percentile 
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Table 5  
Descriptive statistics by fund types: foreign/domestic and bond/equity.  The last six columns 
contain test for difference in two means.  For example, column “2-1” compare average domestic 
bond (1) to average foreign bond.  “y” indicates statistical significance at 5 percent level based 
on two-sample t-tests.  All variables except CAR and LN_OPEN_DAYS are measured one week 
before the termination announcements. 
 
   Bond  Equity                   













   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)                   
CAR  8.66  5.62  7.47  5.23                   
Fund Discount  17.12  9.59  14.94  10.79  y     y  y       
Aggregate 
Discount  6.43 3.05 14.05 9.15  y  y  y      y  y 
NAV residual σ  1.35  0.84  2.95  2.16     y  y     y    
Expense Ratio  1.12  1.21  1.88  1.21     y  y        y 
Asset Turnover 
(log)                   
Trading Illiquidity  0.10  0.02  0.02  0.08                   
Inverse Share 
Price  0.14  0.12 0.11 0.09      y      y  y   
Dividend Yield  6.31  7.51 6.16 6.53             
Unrealized Gains 
as % of total 
assets  -1.42  -1.17  5.64  13.46     y  y   
Total Assets 
(log)                   
Listing Age in 
CRSP (log)                   
Number of Days 
to termination 
(log)  5.05  4.73  4.99  4.71                   
Observations  4  40  43  15                   
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Table 6 
Regression results.  The dependent variable is the CEF discount.  The first and second 
regressions are estimated separately.  The “Difference” column is estimated by pooling data 
before and after the announcement together and using a dummy variable to interact with each 
of the explanatory variables.  INVS captures investor sentiment by using the aggregate discount 
measure. SIGH captures the signaling hypothesis using dividend yields.  EXPR captures the 
agency cost hypothesis by using expense ratios. TRNS is a proxy for transaction costs using 
the inverse of share price.  PRTU captures the portfolio uniqueness hypothesis by using the 
NAV residual σ. ASTI is the asset illiquidity captured by portfolio turnover, and TRDI is the 
trading illiquidity captured by Amihud’s (2002) measure. The unrealized capital gains are 
captured by the TAXL variable. The t-statistics are calculated using heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard error (White, 1980).  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
   
  Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
Variables  One Week before 
announcements 
One Week after 
announcements 
Difference 
   Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
CONSTANT  0.576 (0.12)  -1.223 (-0.31)  1.799 (0.24) 
INVS  0.597 (4.92)***  0.295 (3.00)***  0.302 (1.94)* 
SIGH  -0.277 (-2.07)**  -0.184 (-2.27)**  -0.092 (-0.59) 
EXPR  0.118 (0.12)  0.130 (0.25)  -0.012 (-0.01) 
TRNS  35.184 (2.47)**  20.408 (1.55)  14.776 (0.76) 
PRTU  1.478 (1.66)*  0.890 (1.74)*  0.588 (0.57) 
ASTI  0.334 (0.95)  0.178 (0.72)  0.156 (0.36) 
TRDI  0.459 (0.78)  1.310 (1.91)*  -0.851 (-0.94) 
TAXL  0.057 (1.67)*  0.022 (0.91)  0.035 (0.85) 
         
Control 
variables         
SIZE  0.577 (0.55)  1.946 (2.31)**  -1.369 (-1.01) 
AGE  1.260 (1.51)  -0.060 (-0.08)  1.320 (1.20) 
FOREIGN  1.119 (0.70)  0.535 (0.44)  0.584 (0.29) 
EQUITY  -5.172 (-3.70)***  -2.532 (-1.66)*  -2.641 (-1.28) 
DUAL  1.567 (0.71)  -0.205 (-0.15)  1.771 (0.68) 
NYSE  0.874 (0.53)  -0.201 (-0.16)  1.075 (0.52) 
D1998  1.595 (1.14)  0.334 (0.42)  1.262 (0.78) 
D2003  0.529 (0.44)  1.720 (1.76)*  -1.191 (-0.77) 
N  102    102        
R
2  0.491     0.384         
 
 Table 7 
Regression results.  The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) measure 
at the termination announcement (event window [0,1]).  All explanatory variables are measure at 
one week before the announcement.  DISC
EXP and DISC
UNEXP are, respectively, the explained 
portion and unexplained portions of discount, calculated by using regression results in Table 6.  









* .  TRDI is the 
trading illiquidity measure.  Days-to-open is the log of the number of days to open-ending or 
liquidation. The t-statistics are calculated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard error (White, 
1980).  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.   
Variables  Panel A  Panel B 
   Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
CONSTANT 2.803 (1.28)  3.815 (1.79)* 
DISC* 0.473 (6.47)***       
DISC
EXP        0.398 (3.78)*** 
DISC
UNEXP        0.744 (9.74)*** 
TRDI -0.431 (-1.24)  -0.386 (-1.19) 
Days-to-Open 0.186 (0.43)  0.130 (0.28) 
Control 
Variables    
SIZE -0.838 (-2.14)**  -1.027 (-2.67)*** 
AGE 0.087 (0.16)  0.271 (0.55) 
FOREIGN -0.529 (-0.72)  -0.020 (-0.03) 
EQUITY -0.951 (-1.24) -0.885 (-1.16) 
DUAL 0.658 (0.72)  0.609 (0.65) 
NYSE 0.347 (0.39)  0.851 (0.95) 
D1998 0.448 (0.74)  0.361 (0.61) 
D2003 -2.938 (-3.05)***  -2.394 (-2.58)** 
N  102    102   
R
2  0.663    0.679   
 
The difference (t-value) between DISC
EXP and DISC
UNEXP is 0.346 (3.76)*** 
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Distributions of the discount sensitivity measures, regression coefficients of discount on 
aggregate discount defined as follows.  
10
,0 1 2 , , ,
1
it t t it i j it j i
j
DISC INVS INVS I DISC u    

      
For each of the sampled closed-end funds, the regression model is estimated using data from 
52 weeks (plus 10 weeks for autoregressive terms) before the announcement date to either 52 
weeks after the announcement date or termination date.  The parametric t-test and two non-
parametric Sign test and Sign Rank test are reported to test hypothesis 0 : 2   A H .   
Statistics  1    2   
N  103    103    
Mean  0.52    -0.84    
Median  0.50    -0.76    
Standard Deviation  0.64    1.28    
Min  -1.96    -8.25    
Max  2.12    3.54    
t-test (p-value)  8.18 (<0.0001) -6.69  (<0.0001) 
Sign test (p-value)  37.5 (<0.0001) -39.5  (<0.0001) 
Sign Rank test (p-value)  2066 (<0.0001) -2102  (<0.0001) 
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Figure 1 
Time series behavior of the price and NAV of a hypothetical portfolio for the period from one year before to one year after the 
termination announcement.  The portfolio is created one year before the announcement with equal ($100) dollar investment in each 
sample fund.  Based on the price of the inception date, the number of shares of each fund is fixed.  These weights are applied in 
subsequent periods to obtain the price and NAV of the portfolio.  Liquidation amounts are not reinvested in the portfolio. 
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Figure 2 
Average discount (along with its 95 percent confidence interval bound) from one year before to one year after the termination 
announcement  
PLOTU 95 L95 di scount
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Figure 3 
Average abnormal returns (AAR) on the sampled CEFs during open-ending announcements.  The open-ending announcement date 
is set equal to zero.  The abnormal returns are the differences between realized returns and expected returns.  The expected returns 
are calculated using a market model using equally-weighted CRSP index returns as market returns.  The parameters are estimated 
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Figure 4 
Plot of sensitivity of discount to the aggregate discount.  The regression model is estimated weekly using cross-section data of 103 
closed-end funds.  The 95 percent confidence bound is plotted along with the coefficient. The sensitivity is measured by  1   
coefficient in the following regression:  i t t i v DISC AGG DISC    _ 1 0 ,    